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Among the most powerful (and most anonymous) of our nation's
financial institutions are bank trust departments. They manage assets
substantially exceeding the assets of the largest one hundred corpora-
tions in the United States.' In fact, bank trust departments have larger
securities portfolios than all other institutional investors combined.2
As a result, certain commercial banks have the potential power to
control major corporations. 3
Yet, the regulation of bank trust departments seems cursory in many
respects compared to that applied to other institutional investors. Only
superficial data are gathered by bank examiners, whose responsibilities
relate primarily to the banks' other departments. Even less information
is made available to the public. In the past, recommendations for re-
form have focused on increasing public disclosure of investment activ-
ity4 and making trust department regulation similar to that of other
financial institutions.5
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1. As of 1971, the total assets managed by bank trust departments were valued at
336 billion dollars. Patman, Other People's Money, Tue NEW REuBL1G, Feb. 17, 1973,
at 14. Based on 1971 figures, the largest one hundred corporations had less than 300
billion dollars worth of assets. See FORTUNE DoUmE 500 DimcroRy (1972).
2. The amount of all bank trust departments' securities holdings exceeded the sum of
securities administered by investment advisors, insurance companies, self-administered
employee benefit plans, foundations, and education endowments. SEC, INsrrrTo.AL I-
vEsTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 2, at 413-14 [hereinafter
cited as IIS REPORT]. As of April, 1968, the size of bank trust departments' securities
holdings was IZ238.6 billion. STAFF REPORT FOR TIlE HOUSE SUrcO.Ms. ON DOMrSC FI-
NANCE, COMM.t. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90Txs CONG., 2o SESS., CO EIMi.CIAL ALNrs
AND THEIR TRUST AcTrIvrrIEs: EMERGING INFLUENCE ON -ie AMERICAN ECONoMY 47 (Comm.
Print 1968) [hereinafter cited as PATMAN REPORT].
3. PA'TAN REPORT, supra note 2.
4. The SEC has recommended that all professional portfolio managers, including those
not presently registered with the SEC, provide improved public disclosure of investment
return, portfolio volatility, and short-term trading. IIS REPORT, supra note 2, pt. 1, at
XI, XIII.
5. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUCTULItE AND REGULATION
(1971) [hereinafter cited as HUNT CO.MtMISSION REPORT]. The Hunt Commission Report
recommended that the bank examining agencies assure themselves that banks were not
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This article concentrates instead on the bank examination process-
and suggests that it be upgraded to preclude practices exploiting loop-
holes in the present laws. It also proposes that the Securities and Ex-
change Commission be given jurisdiction to collect information about
bank securities and portfolio management policies.
II. Bank Trust Department Investment Practices and
Regulatory Responses6
The overriding reason for examining commercial banks7 generally
has been to assure bank depositors of the bank's continuing solvency. 8
Bank trust department examinations are conducted by regulatory
agencies9 and bank directors' ° to assure that the trust department has
trading on the basis of commercial department or other "inside" information, were
properly investing cash, and were properly handling the commission brokerage of their
securities transactions.
6. To obtain some insight into bank trust department examinations and investment
activities, confidential interviews wete conducted with regulatory agency officials and
bank trust department officers during the first four months of 1972. Officials of several
states and several branches of all three federal regulatory agencies were interviewed. Also
interviewed were officers of several banks in each major Eastern money-center city, In
several major Midwest money-center cities, and in several major Southern moneycenter
cities. A prerequisite to obtaining interviews with federal regulatory agency officials and
bank trust department officers was the author's agreement that the sources of iifor-
mation would not be identified.
7. Definitions of certain terms used in this Article may be helpful to the reader. A"commercial bank" for purposes of this Article means a corporation that engages in re-
ceiving demand deposits subject to checks and "time and savings" deposits. Using these
deposits, the corporation makes loans of various kinds, including business, consumer,
personal and real estate loans. The term "bank" or "bank complex" is used here to
mean a commercial bank which may provide trust services to its customers, and not a
mutual savings bank, savings and loan association, insurance company, finance com-
pany or other financial institution which may compete with banks but does not meet
the traditional concept of a commercial bank. A "trust company" is a state-chartered
corporation empowered by its charter to engage in all kinds of trust activities; It may
or may not be a commercial bank. Generally, trust companies are not subject to federal
regulation; and thus, they are outside the scope of this Article.
8. See, e.g., Davis, Banking Regulation Today: A Banker's View, 31 LAw & CONTEINt'.
PROB. 639, 640 (1966); Masters, Trust Examinations-Developinent of Supervisory Protec-
tion for Better Service, 93 TRUST & ESrATES 280. 282 (1954). But see Miller, Trust Super-
visor's Role-Improved Services Through Exchange of Ideas Between Trustinen and Su-
pervisory Authority, 103 TRUST & ESTATES 1244 (1964).
9. All national banks are examined by the Comptroller of the Currency; certain state-
chartered member banks of the Federal Reserve System are examined by the regional
Federal Reserve bank; and all remaining state-chartered, non-Federal Reserve system banks
insured by the FDIC are examined by the FDIC. See IIS REPORT, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 442-
43; Robertson, Federal Regulation of Banking: A Plea for Unification, 31 LAW & CONTEI'.
PROB. 673, 674 (1966) [hereinafter cited as ROBERTSON]. Non-insured banks and trust
companies are regulated only by whatever local state regulatory agency has jurisdiction
over the respective financial institution. Only the Federal Reserve presently has trust
examination specialists; the FDIC and Comptroller examiners are basically commercial
bank examiners who have some degree of familiarity with trust examinations. See gen.
erally C. GOLEMBE, THE ECONOMIC POWER OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 56-59 (1969); Randall,
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Regulatory Functions Philosophy, 31 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 696 (1966). Few state banks administering trust assets operate outside
the FDIC insurance umbrella of 20,000 per deposit; at the end of 1969, there were 3,289
insured banks and only forty-nine non-deposit, non-insured trust companies. FDIC ANN
RE'. 242 (1969). Thus, very few bank shareholders were without the benefit of some
federal oversight.
10. State and federal laws require that directors of banks conduct annually their own
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not breached its fiduciary duties and subjected the bank to potential
suits which might threaten its solvency."1 Rather than prohibit abso-
lutely by rule specific activities, bank regulatory agencies have long
informally prescribed what sound fiduciary principles require.'2 This
traditional informality may be maintained by expanding the role of
the individual trust examiner. As an improved trust examination
process would provide a natural occasion for communication between
the regulators and the regulated, it may ultimately strengthen bank
self-regulation. The reforms envisioned by this section can be adopted
by mutual consent of examiners and banks, or if necessary by rule-
making within existing bank regulatory agencies.
A. Conforming Investments
Bank trust investment activity must conform with the explicit in-
vestment directions of a trust instrument 3 and with general fiduciary
principles. Trust accounts with specific investment restrictions are
reviewed yearly for conformity to the instrument's express limitations;
the unrestricted trust instruments, those giving the trust department
unlimited investment discretion, are reviewed broadly for conformity
to "prudence,"1 4 through a perusal of both a trust department's "ap-
proved list"'3 and its actual holdings. The present system has two
possible defects. First, the trust examiners may be able to review only
a third or a quarter of the large number of restricted trust accounts
each year.'6 Second, the test for "prudence" has been unsophisticated:
it has meant scrutiny only of the risk profiles of individual securities,
internal examination. See, e.g., CAL FIN. CODE ANN. § 1902 (West 1958. Supp. 1971); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 122 (McKinney 1971); 7 PA. ANN. STAT. § 1407(a) (Purdons 1968). See, e.g.,
12 C.F.R. § 9.9 (1972). Because this section of the Comptroller of the Currency"s Regula-
tions is usually referred to as Regulation 9 by persons in the banking industry, it will
hereinafter occasionally be referred to as such.
11. E. NEiLAN, TRUST EXAMINATION: AN ExAtI.NER's ANALYStS 28 (1939) [hereinafter
cited as NEILAN].
12. Miller, Regulation of Fiduciaries, A.m B.A.' Es Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS, FIDUCARY
REsPONSIBILITY SaaiixAR 56, 58 (July 22, 1970) [hereinafter cited as MillER].
13. NEILAN, supra note 11, at 54-57; 12 C.F.R. § 9.11 (1972).
14. An "approved list" generally consists of several hundred securities which haic
received the trust department investment committee's approval for investment by trust
accounts.
15. State law, statutory and judicial, may be applicable to the investment powers of
a trustee when the trust instrument is silent or simply follows state law. Thus, the
"prudent man" rule, since it is rarely waived in the trust instrument, is usually the
ultimate test. See, e.g., Harvard College v. Amory. 26 Mass. (9 Pick) 446, 461 (1830). For a
discussion of present fiduciary investment practices and policy, see Trustee's Duties Re-
garding Investments, 4 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST L.J. 604 (1969). Liability is now in-
curred when the trustee violates his duty "to make such investments as a prudent man
would make of his own property having primarily in view the preservation of the estate
and the amount and regularity of income to be derived." 2 A. Scot, LAw oF Tnusis
1409-10 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as ScoTr].
16. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPMOLLER'S MANUAL FOR RP-ESErNEA'I'IrF-S IN
TRUST 46, 60 (1969) [hereinafter.cited as Co. tPTmoLLW'S MA UL].
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when wise investment or portfolio practice may demand a mix of specu-
lative and blue-chip securities.
Trust examiners and bank trust department officials agree that the
incidence of non-conformity is very small in relation to the number
of trust accounts under management.' 7 In part, this low incidence may
be attributable to the periodic review for clerical errors and noncon-
formance performed by account managers, trust departments' invest-
ment committees, and the banks' internal auditors. Also, since trust
departments are generally required by state law to review each trust
account at least annually,'8 trust examiners may review for conformity
in effect when they review a trust department investment committee's
minutes.
As to the meaning of "prudence," a more useful test than the per-
formance of individual securities may be the risk profile and total
return of the entire investment portfolio. 19 Based on portfolio theory,20
the total return concept posits that reasonable investment decisions can
be made on the basis of risk2 ' and expected return. Use of the total
return concept enables the investor to balance the riskiness of his
investment portfolio against his outside investments in risk-free assets,
such as U.S. Savings Bonds.2 2 Because these investments are risk-free,
his investment portfolio can accept greater risks and produce a larger
total return. Also, diversity in terms of the number and speculativeness
of individual securities is necessary because the general risk of an in-
vestment portfolio is not the weighted average of the risks of the indi-
vidual securities..2 Rather, to the extent that prices of individual securi-
17. An average figure for nonconformity, corroborated by bank regulatory agencies
and trust department officials, is four or five accounts per thousand trust accounts under
management.
18. NEILAN, supra note 11, at 56. See COMI'MOLLER'S MANUAL, supra note 16, at 64.
19. Briefly, this concept focuses on the total return generated by the investment
portfolio over a period of time, rather than on specific gains or losses on the individual
securities in the portfolio. A parallel to the trust examiner's review for conformity has
long existed in the securities law concept of suitability. Some commentators have
recommended the total return concept as a useful test for suitability or conformity. Note,
The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARv. L. REV. 603, 617 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as HARVARD NOTE]. See also Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Econonic Theory,
80 YALE L.J. 1604, 1609 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COHEN]. Under the suitability doc-
trine, a broker must determine before making any investment recommendations what fi-
nancial circumstances (e.g., restrictions) each customer enjoys, just as a trust officer
must limit investments for each trust account to those which conform to the trust in-
strument's restrictions. O'Boyle, Suitability, CONFERENCE ON SECURITIES REGULATlON 94
(R. Mundheim ed. 1965).
20. COHEN, supra note 19, at 1607-08.
21. It should be noted that "risk" as used here means relative volatility in se-
curities prices as measured against a base index such as the Standard & Poor's 500. For
a discussion of volatility, see Welles, The Beta Revolution: Learning to Live with Risk,
INST. INV., Sept. 1971, at 21; IIS REPORT, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 400 (app. to § F).
22. COHEN, supra note 19, at 1609-11.
23. HARVARD NOTE, supra note 19, at 618-20.
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ties react differently (in direction or degree) to external events, such
diversity substantially reduces aggregate portfolio risk.2 4 Thus, the total
return concept is rendered meaningless by self-imposed investment re-
strictions in some trust instruments, but it is an intelligent and viable
test of prudent investment for relatively unrestricted trust accounts25
B. Conflicts of Interest, Interlocking Directorates,
Self-Dealing and the Like
Bank complexes provide a number of services for large corporations,
and they may have a variety of relationships with corporate clients
whose securities are held as portfolio investments by trust depart-
ments. 2 6 As a result of the magnitude and variety of these relationships,
banks may be faced with opportunities to abuse their potential eco-
nomic power over their portfolio companies. 27 Also, the presence of
outside directors from industrial corporations on the banks' boards of
directors, 28 and the internal power of industrial corporations having
commercial relationships 9 with the banks, gives corporations power
24. See, e.g., H. MA.RKOVTZ, PORTFOLIO SELEcrIoN: EFFIcIENr DiTnsirial O. or Is-
vEr.NrTS (1959); COH&N, supra note 19, at 1611-14. Beyond a certain point, however,
increasing the number of holdings has no significant marginal effect on aggregate port-
folio risk. Id. at 1613 n.42. Some economists doubt the "justification of increasing port-
folio sizes beyond 10 or so securities . E..." ans & Archer, Diversification and the Re-
duction of Dispersion: An Empirical Analysis, 23 J. FINANcF 761, 767 (1968).
This analysis, of course, does not take market liquidity in an individual security into
account-investment of the assets of a large employee benefit plan fund or common
trust fund in only ten securities would mean intolerably large positions in ten port-
folio companies which could be extremely difficult to acquire or sell. Thus, in prac-
tice, large institutional portfolios are commonly diversified beyond the minimum level
dictated by diversification theory. IIS REPORT, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 436 (Table V-Il).
25. For thorough discussions of present investment practice. see C. Eutss, Nsnr-
TIONAL INVESTING 50-64, 142-53 (1971); Welles, The Beta Revolution: Learning to Live
with Risk, Ixsr. INv., Sept. 1971, at 21.
26. Bank officers and directors often serve as directors for corporations which have
commercial relationships with the bank and whose securities are held by the trust de-
partment for various trust accounts. The bank may also serve as trustee for such a
corporation's employee benefit plans, and as registrar, stock transfer agent, or bond
indenture trustee for the corporation's stocks and bonds.
27. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-5.
28. The Patman Report, like the II Report, conducted a detailed survey of the
forty-nine larger commercial banks in ten metropolitan cities. From this data base, the
Patman Report found 768 interlocking directorates with 286 of the 500 largest industrial
corporations. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. Similarly substantial interlocking di-
rectorates were found between the banks and the fifty largest merchandising, transpor-
tation, utility and life insurance companies. Id. The Patnan Report recommended that
bank officials be prohibited from sitting on the boards of corporations if (1) the cor-
poration's employee benefit plan was administered by the bank, (2) the bank held more
than five percent of the outstanding securities of the corporation, and (3) the corporation
was a similar competing financial institution. Id. at 9-10.
29. The H1S Report dealt with some of the possible reasons why the fifty, largest trust
departments would administer almost seventy percent of the total of al trust assets.
While it could not establish cause and effect, the existence of employee benefit fund
trust accounts was closely associated with aggregate demand deposits in the bank. In
addition, large demand deposits (greater than $100,000) were more closely correlated with
trust department assets than demand deposits as a whole. IS RErPonr, supra note 2, pt.
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to affect trust department investment decisions. Although bank trust
department officials deny that the bank's directors influence invest-
ment choices, or that the trust department knows which corporations
have significant relationships with the commercial side of the bank,00
there is evidence that such relationships have been used to influence
trust department decision-making. 31
To prevent misuse of commercial credit information and potential
conflicts of interest, many banks have sought to develop a "wall"
32
separating the trust department from the bank's outside directors, and
the commercial department. The Hunt Commission Report has recom-
mended that a "wall" be required only for banks with more than
200 million dollars of trust assets.3 3 However, bank regulatory agencies
2, at 489. In other words, Ford Motor Co., for example, would typically have large de-
posits with the same bank to which it entrusted its employee benefit plan.
The 11S Report also attempted to measure the importance of the corporation's com.
mercial relationship to the bank and determine whether the existence of commercial re-
lationships between a corporation and the bank increased the likelihood of such cor-
porations being a portfolio company of the bank. Using three dummy variables, which
accounted for the existence of interlocking directorates, geographical proximity, and the
bank's management of the corporation's employee benefit plan, the data indicated a
positive relationship between the size of a corporation's demand deposits and the amount
of its stock held by the bank, and a similar relationship involving loans and bank
holdings. IIS REPORT, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 471-75 (Table V-26). For an analysis of the
ties with the commercial bank and their relative importance to the company, see id.,
pt. 5, at ch. XV. The conclusion which the IIS Report data suggests is that corporate
commercial relationships are important to the bank, that bank employees sensitive to
the relative importance of certain commercial relationships may allow that fact to in.
fluence their buy, sell, or hold decisions, and that some statistical evidence exists to
support this theory of behavior.
30. One bank executive repeatedly stated that it was absurd for anyone to think lie
would risk criminal sanctions just to give a specific trust a limited, temporary boost li
performance by raiding commercial department files. For a specific statement of one
bank's policy on these matters, see INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUI', FIRST NATIONAL CITY
BANK, THE ANATOMY OF AN INVESTMENT 11 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CITIBANK 1971
REPORT]:
However, analysts and portfolio managers in [the trust department] are specif-
ically prohibited from seeking confidential customer information which may be
provided to the commercial banking areas of First National City Bank in conjunc-
tion with lending activities, just as lending officers are prohibited from providing
such information to [trust department] employees. The [blank scrupulously main.
tains complete isolation of the [trust department] investment activities from the
traditional banking functions.
31. See, e.g., PATMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 775-83; IIS REPORT, supra note 2, pt. 5,
at 2271-2843. The case studies in the Patman and HS Reports may generally be charac-
terized as examples of instances where bank management was willing to ignore its fi.
duciary duties to its trust customers to further the interests of its important commercial
customers. For example, in one case, when an attractive offer was made for the stock
of a railroad company held in trust by a Delaware trust company, the trust company
sought to sell the stock for a lower price to two other competing railroad bidders with
which it had interlocking directors. PATMNIAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 775-79.
32. See Herman & Safanda, Commercial Bank Trust Departments and the "Wall,"
14 B.C. IND. & Cost. L. REv. 21 (1972). Bank efforts to create effective "walls" were un-
questionably accelerated in the 1960's after the Merrill Lynch/Douglas Aircraft Co.
inside information case. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8459, [1967-69 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,629 at 83,
347 (1968).
33. HUNT CoIMMSSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 101. It was apparently felt by Hunt
Commission members that the "wall" was impractical in smaller banks where just one or
two persons had line responsibilities in both the commercial and trust departments.
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should consider basing the "wall" requirement on a more effective
criterion: the functional separability of the commercial and trust de-
partments. If a bank officer with line responsibility over both the trust
and commercial departments has subordinates in each department who
exercise lending or investment discretion, a "wall" between those
subordinates should be automatically required regardless of the amount
of trust assets. The trust examination should show the trust examiner
whether or not the bank has sound procedures which actually prohibit
communication between the outside directors, the commercial depart-
ments, and the trust departments. In this regard, the trust examiner can
educate each bank as to the "wall" policies followed by other banks.
Moreover, in scrutinizing potential conflicts of interest, trust ex-
aminers usually receive from banks a list of interlocking directorates
involving corporation and bank officers or directors.34 While that list
may roughly identify trust department holdings subject to improper
external pressure, trust examiners generally are not given a list of those
corporations which have significant commercial relationships with a
particular bank. Except for those bank examiners who may also ex-
amine the commercial side of a bank, trust examiners must rely on
rumor and their own "feel" to assess the potential influence of com-
mercial relationships on trust department securities transactions.
The trust examiner should receive a list 5 of all portfolio corpora-
tions having interlocking directorates or "significant"30 commercial
relationships with the bank. Identification3 7 of the trust accounts
which hold the securities of these corporations and which grant the
bank investment discretion would be the second step.38 The trust ex-
Others have suggested that since there is less possibility of material inside information
in the credit files, and less potential impact of investment actions based upon such
information, the adverse effect of not having a wall would arguably be minimal. Miller,
Current Developments in Trust Supertvision, Ill TRUsr & EsTATES 268 (April 1972) [here-
inafter cited as ComptrOLLr DEVELOPMENTS].
34. COsrrOLLra'S MANUAL, supra note 16, at 87-94. The national bank examiner is
required by the Comptroller's Manual to list "significant" (more than ten percent of
the shares outstanding) bank holdings of stock in accounts where the bank has investment
responsibility.
35. The bank's commercial department, with review by the commercial department
examiners, could prepare a list of all significant commercial customers. The baik's board
of directors, officers, and employees could submit the names of corporations with which
they have officer or directoral responsibilities. Trust examiners could then collate the
data submitted to create the list.
36. It would seem reasonable to develop a sliding scale of "significance" (rather than
some absolute dollar amount) which would select out for extended trust examiner anal)sis
only those accounts, whether the bank be large or small, which might have the potential
to influence trust department investmEnt decisions in the particular bank.
37. In computerized banks, it may be possible to get a "printout" of such accounts.
If, instead, labor-intensive methods of selection are necessary, the banks, trust examiners,
and regulatory agencies will need to work out a method of selection which minimizes
labor costs and lost man-hours.
38. Because trust accounts over which the bank has no investment discretion cannot
be "influenced" in any event, they should not be included on such a list.
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aminer should then focus on the relative performance of such accounts.
Their relatively poor performance, if attributable to the securities of
the identified corporations, would strongly suggest improper influence
on trust department investment choice.
C. Cash Management
Balanced against a bank trust department's fiduciary duty to invest
the trust account's assets,30 overriding liquidity needs may sometimes
require leaving parts of the trust account uninvested. Such needs re-
sult, for example, from preparing for imminent trust account distribu-
tion requirements or postponing investment decisions in anticipation
of a better overall market situation.40 Banks in major money centers
have resolved the dilemma of productivity versus liquidity by creating
internally managed short-term securities funds with a corpus of cor-
porate commercial paper or U.S. government short-term securities.4
1
Administratively, bank trust departments subdivide these short-term
securities funds into units of participation which are "sold" to indi-
vidual trust accounts. 42 Some banks have set a floor on participation
in the funds by pricing each unit at $1000; 43 other banks allow a unit
to be purchased only if it will earn enough trust account profit (gen-
erally, $100) to offset the bank's costs. Since the return on commercial
paper and U.S. government securities has generally been a point or so
less than the prime bank lending rate, short-term securities funds have
earned a significantly larger return than the use of savings accounts
would have afforded.
44
39. 2 ScoTT, supra note 15, at § 181.
40. A trust account may temporarily have parts of its corpus uninvested for other
reasons: Such parts may be proceeds from the sale of a trust asset awaiting reinvestment'
incoming trust corpus from, for example, life insurance awaiting investment; income
earned on corpus investments awaiting reinvestment or distribution; and periodic con-
tributions from a corporation to fulfill its funding requirements under an employee
benefit pension or profit-sharing plan awaiting investment.
41. See, e.g., Butler, Starting a Short-Term Securities Fund, 109 TRUST & ESTATES 490
(June 1970); Schneider, Setting Up A Cash Asset Fund: One Bank's Experience, 110 TRuVr
& ESTATES 372 (1971). Unfortunately, there are only a few viable vehicles available for short-
term cash investment which provide instant liquidity. United States Treasury bills, which
would have liquidity, are currently issued only in round lots of $10,000 and thus are
unavailable for most individual accounts. Dept. of the Treasury Release, Feb. 25, 1970.
42. The unit's price is kept constant for bookkeeping purposes during the term of
the short-term securities fund, so that external fluctuations in the interest rate pre-
vailing on the open market do not affect the unit's value and thereby do not cause the
unit holder to realize a taxable gain or loss on the unit as a specific investment.
43. The rationale advanced for this price is that participation of at least $1000 Is
necessary to cover the "round trip" cost of getting units of participation in and out of
the short-term securities fund. Different banks estimate this cost to be between $10
and $25 for a "round trip."
44. Besides having a lower rate of return, savings accounts result in a greater measure
of illiquidity, since cash must generally be kept in such accounts for a period of one
to three months before interest accumulates. 12 C.F.R. § 217.7 (1972).
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For trust accounts which do not meet the short-term securities funds
participation standards, and for banks without the computer time or
mechanical equipment necessary to administer short-term securities
funds, the alternative employed most frequently has been to deposit
the "uninvestable" cash in the trust department's demand deposit ac-
count on the commercial side of the bank complex. Because banks are
prohibited from paying interest on demand deposits,4 5 the bank com-
plex "saves" the interest on the cash which might otherwise be de-
posited in a savings account, and has significantly more money avail-
able for commercial department operations. 0 The bank complex some-
times gives the trust department, not the individual trusts, credit for
the amount saved, thereby increasing the profitability of trust depart-
ment operations.47 Thus, those banks lacking short-term securities
funds arrangements sacrifice trust income for liquidity while enjoying
the use of the uninvested cash. The Hunt Commission Report has ex-
pressed concern that more frequent analysis and review of bank policy
may be desirable whenever a bank lacks short-term securities funds or
sets minimum participation requirements for such funds at levels too
high for some accounts to qualify.
48
In a bank with short-term securities funds, a bank trust department
account manager faces a potential conflict of interest: placing the cash
in a short-term securities fund to earn the trust account a return, or
placing the cash in the trust department's demand deposit on the com-
mercial side of the bank to improve his department's profitability.
Since the trust department's commissions for managing accounts will
not be affected, while the net profitability of the trust department
45. 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1940). The Federal Reserve Board has determined in its Regu.
lation Q that "demand deposits" are deposits where the depositor has a legal right to
receive his deposit back in full in less than thirty days. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.1, 217.2 (1972).
See Hexter, That Which Tle Call A Deposit . .., 26 Bus. Lm. 69 (1970).
46. The IS Report found that, for 1969, the indirect value of demand deposits at-
tributable to trust department relationships, e.g., broker balances, portfolio company
balances, and trust department deposits, amounted to thirty percent of direct commis-
sion income, or approximately .06 percent of trust department assets. Us RExor, supra
note 2, pt. 2, at 480, 482, 483. For trust department deposits alone, the 11S Report esti-
mated that the value of the deposits was worth 26.6 percent of direct commission
revenues. Id., pt. 2, at 481.
47. Credit received from the commercial department can substantially affect the trust
department's profitability. According to a survey taken by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, the trust departments ot ten large New York City banks received commercial
department credit for deposits for 1971 in the amount of $114.1 million, bringing ad-
justed net earnings to about $95.7 million. Big New York Banks' Corporate Trust Losses
Shrank Sharply in 1971, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 1972, at 21, col. 2.
48. HUNT COEMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 102. On the other hand, there is a
long tradition in trust examinations of focusing heavily on cash management. NILA,%,
supra note 11, at 54. Uninvested cash is also one highly visible item in a trust cus-
tomer's monthly statement from the bank to which all statement recipients can relate.
whether they are sophisticated corporate treasurers monitoring pension trusts or house-
wives monitoring grandparents' legacies.
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may be enhanced, the trust account manager may be improperly in-
fluenced, at least on close decisions, to keep the cash in a demand
deposit. 49 To prevent potential conflicts of interest, and to increase
productivity without loss of liquidity, regulatory agencies could con-
sider prohibiting trust department deposits on the commercial side of
a bank5o or seeking legislation to allow payment of interest on de-
mand deposits. 51 However, a less disruptive remedy would be to re-
quire the use of short-term securities funds wherever possible. The
trust examiner could educate smaller banks about how to establish
their own short-term securities funds based on the experience of
larger banks in his geographic region. Shifting more banks into collec-
tive cash investment plans would raise the overall return of trust ac-
counts under bank management, thereby making banks more attrac-
tive as money managers. Smaller banks could form joint ventures""
and thus achieve important economies of scale in the short-term securi-
ties markets. In addition, the trust examiner could accumulate tech-
nical information which might help banks to reduce substantially the
floor for participation in short-term securities funds 3 and thus extend
collective cash investment to all trust accounts regardless of cash bal-
ance size. Finally, if internal short-term securities funds cannot be
established for cost reasons, bank regulatory agencies should consider
requiring the use of external short-term securities funds. 4
49. In the aggregate, while such cash subject to conflict of interests may total about
.76 percent of the total assets under management in the fifty largest trust departments,
a relatively insignificant amount to these bank complexes, the cash is still significant
in its dollar amount: 1,476,300,000 dollars at the end of 1969. IIS REroRT, supra note 2,
pt. 2, at 429 (Table V-4).
50. Interviewed bank officials suggested that prohibiting the deposit of trust depart.
ment cash on the commercial side of a bank would only lcad to complex "sweetheart"
deposits among competing financial institutions. While such arrangements would trans.
gress antitrust laws, they would be extremely difficult to discover, police and prove.
51. ROBERTSoN, supra note 9, at 675-80; Kreps, Modernizing Banking Regulation, 31
LAw & CONTEMP'. PRoB. 648, 661 (Aug. 1966). Allowing payment of interest on demand
deposits would have broad implications. For example, commercial customers (including
brokers) who must presently "pay" a fixed price for demand deposits to the bank would
not continue to have the concomitant economic power to demand "free" or discounted
services from banks. The Hunt Commission specifically recommended that the prohi-
bition against the payment of interest on demand deposits be retained, supra note 5, at 27.
52. One interesting joint venture has been created by the Citizens and Southern
National Bank for the Atlanta area. It organized an investment company whose shares
will be purchased for trust customers by other banks and trust institutions of that
region which are unable, because of their small size, to administer their own common
trust funds. INvESco EQUITY FUND, INc. PROSPECTus, August 21, 1972.
53. Rather than setting the floor for participation in the short-term securities fund
in terms of the investment needed for the bank to break even on the transaction costs,
a more useful approach would be to eliminate the floor for participation and charge
the trust customer an aliquot share of the costs. One drawback to this suggestion Is
that the "transaction costs" are not easily identifiable by bank trust departments.
54. Only quite recently have short-term securities funds been registered with the SEC
as mutual funds. Hershey, Overnight Mutual Funds for Surplus Assets, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 7, 1973, § F, at 5, col. 2. SEC Approves Registration of Mutual Fund Managed by
Bank, 190 BNA SEC Reg. & L. Rep., at A-8 (Feb. 21, 1973).
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D. Best Execution and Brokerage Allocations for Research
In securities transactions for accounts without directed brokerage,m
the bank trust department's trader is bound to seek "best execution." 5o
This duty requires the trader to get the best net realized price for a
specific security by initiating price inquiries wherever the security is
traded, be it the NYSE, regional exchanges, 5T NASDAQ,"'s the third
market,5 9 or the fourth market.0 0 However, trust departments some-
times direct brokerage to certain Wall Street brokerage houses"' as a
55. "Directed brokerage" is the securities industry's shorthand for trust instruments
which contain specific instructions as to whcre the trust's securities transactions are
to be taken for execution. Personal and corporate agency accounts frequently hac
such instructions. But employee benefit plans accounts, common trust funds, and large
personal estates and trusts generally do not. IIS RrPoRT, supra note 2, pt. 2. at 437
(Table V-12).
56. "Best execution" refers to the fiduciary duty to place portfolio transactions in
such a way that achieves the best result for the trust account. see, e.g., Delamare Man-
agement Co., SEC Securities Exchange Release No. 8128 (Jul) 19, 1967). (1966-1967
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. Rap. f 77,458, at 82.883 (1967); Consumer-Investor
Planning Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8542 (Feb. 20, 1969), [1967-
1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. c 77,677, at 83,52 (1969). This phrase
implies that the trust department's purchases and sales for its trust customers will be
made at the best available price. Best execution means best net realized price in terms
of the price per share, the lowest possible commission charge, and various non-price
considerations such as execution ability, brokerage commission rate, back office service,
and, perhaps, research commitments. Phillips, Best Execution and Negotiated Rates,
THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULA*TION 319-20 (R. Mundheim & A. Fleischer,
Jr. eds. PLI 1972) [hereinafter cited as TiDw ANNUAL 1,sTrruT]. In Mr. Phillips'
opinion, best price is the main element of best execution. Id. at 320.
57. Some NYSE-listed securities are dually listed on a regional stock exchange. See,
e.g., Loehwing, Wall Street West, BARRON'S, March 20, 1972. at 3.
58. NASDAQ, the acronym for the NASD's Automated Quotations System which began
in February 1971, is a centralized nationwide electronic over-the-counter auction market
system which contains some NYSE-listed securities. Katz, NASD Automated Quotations
System, TiniRD ANNUAL INsTITUTE, supra note 56, at 359 et seq.
59. The "third market" is a specialized segment of the over-the-counter market which
deals in NYSE-listed securities. See SEC, Public Policy Implications of Investment Com-
pany Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 159.61 (196) [hereinafter cited
as PPI]. Because the third market-makers do not have to charge the NYSE fixed minimum
brokerage commission rate, when institutions trade in the third market, they usually
save a considerable amount of money, II$ REPORT, supra note 2, pt. 4. at 1-165.
60. The "fourth market" refers to direct trades between institutions which are not
reported on exchange tapes. PPI, supra note 59, at 161.
61. One constraint on best execution existed before late 1969, when many banks
allocated some brokerage according to the size of eact broker's demand deposits with
the bank complex.
In late 1969, as much as seventy-five percent of "free" (nondirected) brokerage com-
missions were so allocated. Fiske, How Banks Pass Out Commissions, INST. INv., DMc. 1969,
at 29 [hereinafter cited as BANK Co.tsnsIoNs1. Based on 1969-1970 data, tile 115 Report
found a "strong relationship" between bank commission allocations and the size of
brokerage house demand deposits. IIS REPORT, supra note 2, pt. 2., at 470. Persons in-
terviewed by IIS staff suggested that the typical reward ratio of deposits to commissions
was ten to one. Id., pt. 2, at 471; BANK COM.ssSIoNS, supra, at 35. Obviously, because
the demand deposits are so valuable to a bank complex. and because brokerage com-
missions could attract brokerage house deposits, the more sophisticated trust customers
successfully bargained for a zero fee to the bank based on tie commissions (and con-
sequential brokerage house deposits) that the trust was expected to generate. Id. at 37.
However, subsequent to the Justice Department Antitrust Division's complaint that al-
locating brokerage according to demand deposits violated antitrust laws (A.-aI.-truN
BANKER, Sept. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 1), and under pressure from suits like the one brought
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reward for research received. 62 When trades are executed on the
NYSE where fixed minimum commissions are set above their objective
economic value, 3 banks apparently have a duty to demand some bene-
fit such as research 64 in return for the excess of the fixed minimum
commission over its competitive value.65 Best execution under these
against Chemical Bank alleging that this practice violated fiduciary principles, Schaffer
v. Chemical Bank, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. RFr. 93,403, at
92,014 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), banks voluntarily ended such reciprocal business with brokerage
houses. Yet bank trust department officials interviewed by the author suggested that,
while they refuse to consider the broker's commercial relationships with the complex
when executing transactions, not all brokers have forgotten how potent their demand
deposits once were. For corroborating evidence, see Bleakley, End of an Era?, INST. INV.,
Feb. 1972, at 27, 30 [hereinafter cited as BLEAXLEY].
In any event, to protect against recurrence of reciprocal practices based on demand
deposits between brokers and banks, bank regulatory agencies and trust examiners should
be certain that the "wall" established between a bank's commercial and trust depart-
ments extends to the trust department's traders. Again, the trust examiner may educate
the banks which he examines about the "wall" procedures of other banks in the cx-
aininer's geographic region. See pp. 982-83 supra.
62. Depending upon the type of trade involved, allocating brokerage as a reward
for research may or may not threaten best execution. A routine trade of, say, 100 shares
of AT&T can be handled in a competent manner by virtually every broker, and allo-
cating the trade according to research received probably does not affect best execution
of the trade. However, for best execution, a non-routine trade may require execution
through specific brokers who have special block-trading abilities, and these brokers with
special trading skills may not have reputations for excellent research. If a bank sends
a non-routine trade to a broker as a research reward without regard to his special
abilities, best execution may be lost.
One midwestern bank trust department in the spring of 1972 executed all trades for
less than 1,000 shares in the third market, all trades for over 10,000 shares through the
block-trading specialists. Thus, only trades between 1,000 and 10,000 shares could be
used by the trader to reward for research. As the breakpoint for negotiating commission
rates is lowered from $300,000 to $100,000, the area for research reward based on excess
in fixed minimum rates will be smaller; and in this bank's system, $100,000 will be-
come the new ceiling and 1,000 shares the new floor for allocating brokerage for re-
search. Clearly, this bank's perceived need to reward for research through brokerage
commissions may cause it to allocate brokerage to a firm without regard to the avail.
ability of better prices elsewhere. See Feuerstein & Phillips, Reciprocity for Research and
for Sales of Fund Shares, THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 56, at 335, 336.
Trust departments have elaborate methods for calculating the amount of brokerage
allocations based on the quality of research ideas, follow up, timeliness, etc. See Mattlin,
Bank Research in the Age of Negotiated Rates, INST. INV., May, 1971, at 21 [hereinafter
cited as BANK RESEARCH]; Orth, Analyzing the Analysts: Can Their Performance Realy Be
Measured?, INT. INV., Oct. 1972, at 91; Bloom, The Great Money Game, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 16, 1972, § 6 (Magazine) at 10; Best 'Paper Portfolio' Has Appreciated 90% in
Chase Bank's Game, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1972, at 18, col. 2. Bank trust departments
usually make no effort to segregate brokerage by trust account or collectively-Investcd
fund. Rather, the bank trader may place a prescribed amount of portfolio brokerage
transactions with a specific broker without knowing which trust account or collectively-
invested fund received the research product, if the prior research purchased has directly
benefitted any one account.
63. See generally Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public,
22 STAN. L. REV. 675 (1970).
64. In exchange for brokerage commission allocations, the banks can get from brokers
computer software services, research packages, stock certificate processing and storage, and
economic forecasting. See, e.g., BANK COMMISSIONS, supra note 61, BANK RESEARCH, supra
note 62; BLEAKLEY, supra note 61.
65. While the law is unsettled on this point, courts have moved toward establishing
such a duty. See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub noa.
Johnson v. Moses, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). In any case, bank trust departments have been
advised by counsel of the probable existence of such a duty, and have behaved as If one
clearly existed.
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circumstances may require, in effect, an insistence on research service
in exchange for the forced premium paid to brokers as a result of the
fixed minimum commissions. As the breakpoint for the application
of fixed minimum commissions is reduced and virtually all of the
excess disappears,"0 , the duty will be correspondingly obviated. Banks
may then argue that they should be allowed to pay for research by
adding a voluntary premium to the brokerage execution commission
borne by the trust account. The issue will be whether such premium
"soft dollar" 7 expenditures should be permitted.
The SEC has indicated that such expenditures are acceptable. 8
When it was suggested that legislation was needed to clarify the legal-
ity of institutional investors spending premium soft dollars for re-
search,69 the SEC affirmed that"
[While the obligation to obtain the best security price remains,
[an institutional investor] isn't required to seek the brokerage
service that carries the lowest cost as long as the difference in cost
was "reasonably justified by the quality of the service offered."
66. April, 1974, has leen set as the goal for reducing the breakpoint for negotiating
brokerage commissions to $100,000. SEC Sets April 1974 As Goal for Trimming Nego.
tiated-Rate Cutoff to $100,000 Level, Wall St. J., March 23, 1972, at 4, col. 2. Most in-
stitutional-sized trades are between $100,000 and $200,000. Bleakley, Where Do l'e Go
From Here?, INsr. INV., Jan., 1973, at 44, 46 (hereinafter cited as Progress Report].
Few institutional-sized securities transactions are smaller than $100,000. Thus, when
the brokerage commissions of trades greater than $100,000 are negotiable, few trades
of institutional size will contain the traditional excess in fixed minimum commissions
necessary to purchase peripheral services.
67. In the parlance of the securities industry, "hard dollars" are those paid by an
institutional investor against its own account. "Soft dollars" are those charged by an
institutional investor against individual accounts, such as brokerage commissions on sales
or purchases. Thus, services like research bought with the excess in fixed minimum
brokerage commissions are known as soft dollar services, viz., soft dollar research. The
term "premium soft dollars" is used here to mean a soft dollar payment for research
added onto a negotiated soft dollar payment for bare execution, which together become
the total brokerage commission charged for execution of the securities transaction.
68. The SEC has commented:
Concern has been voiced that under such circumstances institutional managers
charged with a fiduciary duty would be reluctant to pay a higher commission rate
which reflected research. The Commission believes that they should not be. In our
opinion, the providing of investment research is a fundamental element of the brok-
erage function for which the bona fide expenditure of the beneficiary's funds is
completely appropriate, whether in the form of higher commissions or outright
cash payments.
SEC, Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets (Feb. 2, 1972), 137 BNA
SEc. MEG. & L. REP. pt. 2, at 7 [hereinafter cited as Ftxrua Smucrun STATENT i ].
69. Institutional Investors Say They May Need Clarifying Legislation, Wall St. J., April
18, 1972, at 4, col. 3.
70. Applicability of the Commission's Policy Statement on the Future Structure of the
Securities Markets to Selection of Brokers and Payment of Commissions by Institutional
Manager, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 717 (May 9. 1972), (1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RE,. 78,776, at 81,631 (1972); SEC Says Institutions
Must Seek Best, Not Always Cheapest Brokerage Services, Wall St. J., May 10, 1972, at
2, col. 4. Address of Chairman William J. Casey, Quality Service in Brokerage, before
Securities Industry Association, New York, Oct. 11, 1972.
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However, several arguments against such expenditures can be made. 71
First, because brokers do not specifically charge for research, trust
beneficiaries cannot calculate how much of any brokerage commission
was paid for this service. Second, the benefit of research is rarely trace-
able to specific trust accounts, and the ratios of benefits to costs may
be very different among individual accounts. Third, each trust already
pays a commission to a bank for its trust department's services which
supposedly includes a charge for investment research. Thus, when
research is purchased with brokerage commissions, individual trust
beneficiaries in effect may unknowingly pay twice for research exper-
tise. Finally, since the bank is not paying its own money for the re-
search, it has little incentive to drive a hard bargain for the research
element in the commission. Mounting evidence suggests that few
banks (or other institutional investors) would pay hard dollars for
research.
72
Since banks apparently find Wall Street research a useful and de-
sirable input, bank regulatory agencies must determine whether hard
dollars should be required in payment. 3 Even if premium soft dollar
purchases are allowed, customers certainly deserve full disclosure from
the bank with respect to its practices.7 4 But it is difficult to see how the
bank regulatory agencies could conclude in a manner consistent with
sound fiduciary principles,75 that any sort of premium soft dollar pay-
ment for research should be allowed after the fall of fixed minimum
brokerage commissions. There is no logical reason why a bank could
not pay hard dollars for research services and raise its own commission
fees to cover the additional expense. This action would force banks
71. Other commentators have also been dissatisfied with the SEC's position. See, e.g.,
Address of David Silver, General Counsel of the Investment Company Institute, FBA.CCH
1972 Conference on Mutual Funds. March 15-18, 1972, reprinted as Silver, The SEC
and Mutual Fund Brokerage: A Continuing Regulatory Enigna, 144 BNA SEC. RE. &
L. REP. at D-1 (1972); Eisenberg, Mutual Fund Litigation, 5 REV. SEC. REG. 909 (1972);
Progress Report, supra note 66, at 47. Bleakley, John C. Bogle: A Wellington Whiz Kid
Grows Older, INST. INV., June, 1972, at 63, 98:
[A]lowing people to pay extra soft dollars just opens the door to abuses. Who Is
to say how much extra you can pay? It is just unenforceable.
72. Progress Report, supra note 66, at 47. BANK RESEARCH, supra note 62, at 25.
73. The alternative would be for the courts to resolve the "law" of premium soft
dollars for research. A number of costly suits could be instituted against banks possessing
different policies, at much greater cost to such banks than if the bank agencies settlet
the issue.
74. While Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman of the Subcommittee on Se-
curities, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, has joined the SEC
in its view on soft dollar expenditures, he did so on the condition that the mutual fund
advisory contracts would provide for such payments and such contractual provisitns
would be clearly disclosed to the mutual fund shareholder. Institutional Alembership and
Broker Fees Treated Jointly in Bill Sen. Williams Plans, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1902, at
4, col. 3-4.
75. 2 Sco-rr, supra note 15, at § 170.17 (Use of Trust Property for Trustee's Own
Purposes).
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and their trust customers to evaluate the bank's own research potential.
It would also make customers aware of the amount they had to spend
over and above the trust commission for outside research.
Once bank regulatory agency policy with respect to research has
been established, examination procedures should scrutinize the banks'
"wall" practices to insure that the trust department trader will not
know which broker's research services are purchased. The trust ex-
aminer again may educate a bank trust department about the "wall"
policies adopted by other banks in his examination region.
Finally; the trust examiner and bank regulatory agencies should en-
courage bank trust department officials to develop a comprehensive
definition of best execution.70 However, the quantity of securities
transactions executed by banks would make it impossible for the trust
examiner to scrutinize each transaction for best execution. Gross com-
parisons to the execution patterns of other institutional investors are
not useful in determining a standard for best execution because other
investors have very different purposes and characteristics.7 7 But the
trust examiner should be more sensitive to consistent patterns of avoid-
ance of particular markets or brokers by traders when he reviews
76. Some mutual fund boards of directors have appointed committees of independent
directors to develop a comprehensive definition for best execution for the mutual fund's
traders to follow. Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REv.
179, 257 (1971). In the case of trust departments the regulator), agencies could, of
course, preempt the bank's business judgments and formulate a best execution definition
of their own. Considering the philosophy expressed by Dean Miller, Deputy Comptroller
of the Currency for Trust, however, it is not likely that this will happen. See p. 979
supra. To acquire better trading advantages and enhance the aggregation or bunching
of trading should be encouraged. Since bunching is difficult to accomplish at the trading
stage, procedures should be adopted by banks to increase the awareness of 'arious
account managers within the bank to the possibility of bunching orders or executing
in-house crosses. See BANK REsEARCH, supra note 62, at !:3.
77. Bank trust examiners could compare aggregate mutual fund statistics and ag-
gregate bank execution choices for certain trust accounts. Such a comparison would
theoretically focus on the relative avoidance or use of specific markets as between the
two financial institutions, and thus provide the examiner with gross execution com-
parisons. However, the overall pattern of mutual fund portfolio securities executions
may not be sufficiently comparable to those of certain bank trust deparuntent accounts
to provide such a "model." Banks historically have traded in greater quantities of se-
curities and in smaller share orders sizes than mutual funds. IIS REronT, supra note 2.
pt. 4, at 2169 (Table XIII-7). On the other hand, mutual fund advisors have historically
used brokerage allocations in part as a reward for brokerage house mutual fund sales
efforts. Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. P,. L. Rgv. 205. 252-59 (1970).
Also, some mutual funds have created affiliated regional stock exchange broker-dealer
subsidiaries to recapture brokerage commission dollars. Id., at 247-50; Nutt, A Study of
Mutual Fund Independent Directors, supra note 76. Finally, banks execute securities
transactions which terminate a trust's existence in contemplation of final distribution and
apparently engage in more in-house crosses than mutual fund complexts. Compare, 12
C.F.R. § 9.12(d) (1972), with 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-7 (1972). Howemer, at some future
point, gross execution comparisons between financial institutions may be possible. Comn-
pare Rule 19b-2, 185 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. at F-I et seq. (Jan. 17. 1973) and SEC
Statement on the Adoption of Rule 19b-2 Governing the Utilization of Exchange Mein-
bership for Public Purposes, 185 BNA (part ii) (Jan. 17, 1973) with FumnR SmnU RME
STATEMENT, supra note 68, at 7.
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monthly transaction reports from traders categorizing all securities
transactions by broker, exchange, cost, and type of commission (fixed
or negotiated).
E. Advising Multiple Clients
Since bank trust departments render investment advisory services to
a variety of clients, 7 8 there is a distinct danger that they will favor
some accounts over others in information and trading allocation. For
example, because a corporation's selection of a bank as trustee for its
employee benefit plan funds is revocable1 9 and because the corpora-
tion can be expected to monitor the fund's performance carefully, a
bank may pay more attention to its account than to the typical estate
or personal trust.80 Furthermore, banks in major money centers have
begun to offer the investment advisory services of their trust depart-
ments to other banks-correspondent banks of their commercial de-
partments and non-competing "country" banks, i.e., those outside cen-
tral financial areas. 8 ' They have also begun making available such
services-through subsidiaries or holding companies-to the general
public,8 2 and open- or closed-end investment companies.8 3 Since the
sale of investment advisory services to outsiders generates additional
income, trust department personnel may feel some pressure to attract
more external customers by favoring them over trust accounts in allo-
cating information and trading opportunities. None of the trust ex-
78. For a discussion of the variety of clients a bank trust department may have, see
IIS REPORT, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 420-38.
79. Some corporations designate a bank as trustee but give the investment respon-
sibilities to an outside investment adviser.
80. Corporations establishing employee benefit plans generally give the bank sole
investment discretion, IIS REPORT, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 482 (Table V-7), sole voting
authority, id., pt. 2, at 438 (Table V-13), and do not designate brokerage, id., pt. 2,
at 437 (Table V-12). Of the forty-nine banks in the IIS Report survey, sixty-five percent
of their employee benefit plan accounts are less than $50,000 in value. On the other
hand, thirty percent of their employee benefit plan accounts exceed $500,000.
81. See E. Herman & C. Safanda, Bank Trust Department Investment Services for
Correspondent Banks and Other Subscribers, July 1972 (unpublished paper on file at
the Yale Law School Library). Generally, correspondent banks are banks located in dif-
ferent money centers which provide services for each other. Country banks are non-money
center banks which may utilize the services of money-center banks.
82. Some of the nation's leading financial institutions, including Chase Manhattan
Bank, Bankers' Trust Co., First National City Bank, and Bank of America are adopting
this practice. See, e.g., Fiske, The Banks Fight Back, INST. INv., April, 1972, at 'W
[hereinafter cited as FisKE]; Chase Manhattan Corp. Plans Unit to Handle its Trust
Management, Wall St. J., April 20, 1972, at 15, col. 2. Bankers' Trust Plans to Set Up
Investment Advisory Unit in Florida, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1972, at 6, col. 1; Advertisement
of BA Investment Management Corporation, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1972, at 21, col. 2.
83. On January 24, 1972, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
amended its Regulation Y, 12 U.S.C. § 225.4(a), effective February 1, 1972, to allow
hank holding companies to act under certain circumstances as investment advisors to
investment companies, including mutual funds. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 78,503, at 81,091 (1972).
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amination forms or manuals used by trust examiners deals with the
conflict of interest problems raised by the rendering of investment
advisory services to multiple clients.
8 4
One prime occasion for favoritism among clients is the division of
opportunities to purchase or sell "scarce" securities among trust ac-
counts. For example, several account managers may desire a particu-
larly attractive new issue for their trust accounts, but the trust depart-
ment trader may only be able to get commitments for thirty percent
of that amount from the new issue underwriting syndicate. Or several
account managers may want to sell a specific security at the same time,
but the trader may only be able to get block positioners or third mar-
ket-makers to accept sixty percent of the shares being offered. Whether
the security scarcity arises from market illiquidity, new offerings, or
block transactions, fair allocation of investment opportunities among
all clients requires the establishment and disclosure of trading alloca-
tion formulas.85 The bank trust examiner could check adherence to
this policy by spotchecking allocations.
Another prime occasion for account favoritism is the allocation of
investment information in the form of internal and external research,
or market information." The selection, sequence, and timing of allo-
cation are critical to clients. While certain kinds of unequal allocation
are common, securities law does not clearly state a duty to make infor-
mation equally available.87 Preferential disclosure to a few clients by
84. The Comptroller's Manual advises its trust examiners that the sale of investment
advisory services means the bank is acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to its
subscribers, and thus may be performed only by banks with trust powers. Co.%rmottun's
MANUAL, supra note 16, at D-1. Interviews with bank regulator), officials re~ealed that
trust examiners generally review the investment advisory service package materials only
for improper inclusion of sensitive or confidential data.
85. A fiduciary may act simultaneously in one transaction as the agent for several
clients if all of the parties understand the situation to be so and if the agent subse-
quently deals fairly with those clients. REsT.TEMEr (SEcoND) or AGENCY .q 390.94
(1958). Either full disclosure or custom can provide the "understanding" as among the
various clients. Henderson, Conflicts of Interest for the foney Manager, Tjupw ANNUAL
INsTTTE, supra note 56, at 293. The SEC may believe an allocation policy is essential:
item 1.33 of Form N-1R which must be submitted by mutual funds to the SEC asks the
investment advisor of an investment company to state its trading allocation policy. 3
CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. C 51,963, at 39,852-53. For a description of the allocation formulas
used in some mutual fund complexes, see GLzER, supra note 76, at 237-11.
86. The best Wall Street research has long gone first and sometimes exclusively to
large institutional investors. For example, Merrill Ljmch gives expanded research in-
formation, technical market memos, market information, etc., first to institutional in-
vestors. In some branches, Merrill Lynch keeps all research for institutional use for two
weeks, then gives it to the registered representative in the branch. Loomis, The Merrill
Lynch Bull is Loose on Wall Street, FORTUNE, May, 1972, at 174.
87. Some commentators believe that the custom of preferential information alloca-
tion is legal because that is the reasonable expectation of the customers. Fmsr AsuAL
INSnTSmJT, supra note 19, at 333 (remarks of Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & Leonard Leiman);
THIRD ANNUAL INs-nTuTE, supra note 56, at 307-12 (remarks of Gordon Henderson). For
a contrary view, see THRD ANNUAL INsrrrTUTE, supra note 56, at 310 (remarks of Meyer
Eisenberg).
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a broker prior to publishing a market letter has been condemned by
the New York88 and American Stock Exchanges, 9 and the SEC. 90 Simi-
larly, preferential disclosure of material changes from prior invest-
ment advice arising from research has been disapprovedY1 Yet courts
have not yet defined a general standard for information allocation. 
-
2
Preferential allocation might be upheld on a rationale of customer
consent implied from prior bank disclosure 3 or custom.a But analo-
gies from securities law suggest a better guideline: substantial equal-
ity, at least within classes among clients.
Under such a standard banks would be expected to make informa-
tion available to all clients of the same class at the same time and in
identical form, to the extent practicable. As a minimum, each bank
should require banks to establish a fair and equitable formula for allo-
cation, combined with detailed disclosure thereof to all customers.9
Banks should also obtain written acknowledgment that customers
understand and agree to the formula. A bank trust examiner could
then spot check for bank adherence to its information allocation policy.
88. NYSE, M.F. Circular No. 170, Nov. 16, 1962; NYSE, Guidelines for Member Firm
Communications with the Public 5 (1970).
89. ASE, Info. Circular No. 51-71, April 30, 1971.
90. FIN. ANAL. FED., CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND INSIDER INFORMATION 15 (1968) (re-
marks of Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, Jr.).
91. See FUTURE STRUCTURE STATEMENT, supra note 68, at 6; and Butcher & Sherrerd,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9894 (Dec. 11, 1972) (Findings and Order
Imposing Remedial Sanctions) [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'.
79,135, at 82,460 (1972). See Butcher & Sherrerd Penalized on Tips on Penn Central, Wall
St. J., Dec. 13, 1972, at 2, col. 2. For a contrary view that the Butcher & Sherrerd case If
applied universally is "beyond current expectations and standards," see TiiiRD ANNUAL
INSTITUTE, supra note 56, at 308 n.25 (remarks of Gordon Henderson).
92. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the SEC may obtain an injunction
compelling a registered investment advisor to disclose its practice of purchasing for its
own account just prior to publishing a market letter recommendinF the investment and
then immediately selling its shares upon the rise in the market price following the rec-
ommendation.
93. THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 56, at 305 (remarks of Commissioner Philip
A. Loomis, Jr.).
94. For a discussion of different types of policies used by mutual fund complexes antd
investment advisers for information allocation, see GLAZER, supra note 76, at 219-26; Tiilu
ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 56, at 301 (remarks of Gordon Henderson).
95. Where soft brokerage dollars are used to acquire Wall Street research, conceptu-
ally the bank has an asset (e.g., the research) which "belongs" to all of its trust accounts
for which it has executed securities transactions. Since tracing the research asset pur-
chased back to individual accounts is virtually impossible, it may be regarded as an
indivisible asset belonging to all the accounts. If the trust department sells externally
created, undigested Wall Street research bought with brokerage commission dollars, the
trust accounts would have a good case for recapturing the research sale proceeds on the
ground that the trust department was illegally selling trust assets in breach of its fi.
duciary duties. 2' SCOTT, supra note 15, at § 170.17. See also Provident Management
Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9028 (Dec. 1, 1970), [1970-1971 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,937, at 80,083 (1970). (Officers and directors
of an investment adviser entered into reciprocal agreements to recapture and retain
commissions from the mutual fund's portfolio transactions; this was held to be a breach
of fiduciary duty and antifraud provisions of the securities laws.)
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F. Size of Holdings and Concentration Limitations
As a result of sizeable bank trust department holdings in a single
security, a bank may acquire potential control over major corpora-
tions.96 Representative Wright Patman, Chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, has proposed a ten percent absolute
limitation on a bank's trust department's holdings in a publicly held
corporation.97 However, the wisdom of this limit has been ques-
tioned, 98 and Patman's ten percent limitation seems arbitrary and
unwise for several reasons. First, liquidity considerations generally are
not served by a limit allowing such large holdings; a much lower level
is already observed by most banks. 99 Second, the Patman limit fails
to take account of investment discretion, which is essential to banks'
potential influence on portfolio companies. An accurate indicia of
the bank's power over a portfolio corporation is thus not necessarily
the total amount of its holdings, but the amount over which it has
discretion. Third, banks often receive trusts, some restricted, with
large holdings of a particular security; if an absolute ceiling were im-
96. PATMAN RPoRT, supra note 2, pt. 1, at 9.
97. H.R. 5700, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 13(2) (1971). The securities laws do not constrain
aggregate investment in one security. Section 13(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(d)(1) (1971) requires the disclosure by a "group," when the mem
bers of the group acquire shareholdings in a corporation of five percent or more. How-
ever, except to the extent a bank trust department constitutes a "person" under sections
78(d) and 79(d), because bank trust departments do not have beneficial ownership of
the shares which they hold in trust, they are not subject to the disclosure pro isions
even though their securities holdings in the aggregate greatly exceed the triggering leel.
Unless the trust accounts were aggregated to constitute a "group" for purposes of these
sections, no disclosure would be required.
98. Hearings on H.R. 5700 Before the House Comnmittee on Banking and Currency,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 117 (1971) (remarks of Richard B. Smith, then Commissioner,
Securities and Exchange Commission), at 129 (remarks of William B. Camp, Comptroller
of the Currency). See also C. GOLEIMBE, L. DOsM=rrz and G. FisctR, Tj1E EcoxoMC
PowER OF Co.NmERclAL. BANKS 155-58 (1969).
99. Furthermore, the larger the aggregate position taken by the bank in a portfolio
company, the greater is the discount taken when the block is sold, and the more dif-
ficult it is for the bank to turn a profit. Such a discount is called an illiquidity discount.
C. ELLis, INsrrrtTioNAL INVEsTNG 85 (1971). Bleakley, Illiquidity: Is It Becoming a Prob-
lem Again?, INsT. INV., Sept., 1972, at 42. In disclosing First National City Bank's 1971
investment performance record, Executive Vice President Thomas C. Theobald was
questioned on the fact that none of FNCB's largest stock holdings exceeded five per-
cent of the issuer's common stock. Responding to the implication that five percent was
a limit chosen by FNCB to avoid any disclosure problems, Mr. Theobald stated: "[T]hat
certainly wasn't our primary reason. If we hold more than five percent of a company's
stock, we'd be concerned that we could become locked in; that five percent limit is our
working rule for good market liquidity." The Money Alen, FoRuDs, April 15, 1972, at 44.
Of course, the liquidity problem is only a real threat to accounts with large blocks over
which the trust department has discretion. Large blocks held by the bank without in-
vestment discretion make up part of the aggregate total holdings, but are irrelevant to the
liquidity question because the bank is not responsible for the timing of the sell decision,
only for best execution by the trader when the moment comes. Thus, when discretionary
and non-discretionary blocks are aggregated for purposes of calculating constraints, the
total holdings may well exceed the constraints, while those accounts over which the
bank exercises control are comfortably within any disclosure or liquidity needs.
995
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posed, diversification of either the incoming trust or other trusts
would be compelled, and capital gains taxes would result.100 Alterna-
tively, the chosen bank would have to refuse the proffered trusteeship,
thereby compelling the trust settlor, the estate's executor, or the trust's
beneficiaries to seek another bank.
Better percentage limitations than Patman's can be proposed. Con-
sideration of diversification .and market liquidity support a prohibition
on any bank trust department holding more than five percent 0 1 of
the outstanding securities of a publicly held corporation, aggregating
trust accounts over which the bank has complete investment discre-
tion. To avoid even the appearance of control, the aggregate holdings
of the entire trust department (including all accounts regardless of
investment discretion) should not exceed twenty-five percent of the
outstanding securities of a publicly held corporation. 102
Another concentration problem concerns the number of shares in
one security which the trust department may hold for a specific trust.
The Comptroller's Manual indicates that investment concentration in
a portfolio company is undesirable at some degree for all trust ac-
counts. 103 It suggests as a general rule that not more than twenty per-
cent of the principal of a trust account should be invested in any one
company. 04 The Comptroller's Regulation 9, which governs all com-
100. Forced diversification would not drive the bank into purchasing more desirable
securities, since the ten percent ceiling on those securities would have been the first
ones to have been reached. Ultimately, forced diversification, after several tiers of less
and less desirable stock were exhausted, would simply require investment in the least
desirable, perhaps unsuitable, securities.
101. While any percentage trigger point is somewhat arbitrary, this figure corresponds
to the requirement for SEC disclosure when any person becomes the beneficial owner
of five percent or more of a registered company's stock. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1971).
See note 97. The rationale for the disclosure requirement is that other shareholders have
the right to know of persons seeking control or a large concentration of a corporation's
stock. This policy behind the disclosure requirement may apply to the trust Investment
situation. When a bank trust department is granted unlimited discretion over the trust
accounts in question, it is similar to persons holding five percent or more of a cor-
poration's stock because such a bank can control a corporation to the dissatisfaction of
other stockholders. In fact, trust departments may need a greater restraint than dlis-
closure because they enjoy greater freedom of action in controlling a corporation to
further their own interests (see note 31): they have no direct financial interest in the
results since they are using someone else's money.
102. As indicated by bank officials in interviews, the examples of non.discretionary
concentrations in one security were DuPont, Mellon, Ford, or Disney type family estates
or trusts. Rarely did these types of families own more than twenty percent of the out-
standing shares of a NYSE listed company. Thus, if no more than five percent could
be held by the bank for trust accounts for which it has investment discretion, the twenty
percent additional safety margin would allow for trust accounts over which the bank
has no investment discretion, and would avoid the unfairness of required diversification.
See p. 995 supra.
103. COMPTROLLER'S MANUAL, supra note 16, at 78-79.
104. Id. The Comptroller's Manual exempts from this general rule investment con.
centrations received in kind from the grantor of the trust, retention of which Is spe-
cifically authorized. Id. The HS Report found that in the fifty largest trust departments
sixteen percent of the personal trust accounts with equity holdings above $5 million
held securities of only one company. IIS Rn'orT, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 465.
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mon trust fund investments, 0 provides that the market value of a
common trust fund's investment in any one portfolio company may
not exceed ten percent of the market value of the fund. 100 However,
regardless of the type of trust involved, uncontrollable market fluctua-
tions or other external factors causing changes in securities values can
cause excessive investment in a single security, and thus, should not
trigger punishment from trust examiners. Rather, a bank should be
allowed a reasonable period for restoration of the offending account
to normalcy.'07 Violations due to deliberately excessive purchases by
the bank should be corrected as quickly as possible and should be sub-
ject to normal bank agency criticism.
Finally, some additional limitations on bank trust department securi-
ties concentrations are necessary and desirable. In trust accounts, a
bank should not be permitted to hold or vote shares of its own stock,
stock of its affiliates, or stock of its parent bank holding company.1 08
The effect of such practices might be to perpetuate a bank's manage-
ment; and other types of corporations are similarly precluded from
engaging in them.109 Explicit amnesty might be granted 10 for viola-
tions due to preexisting trust agreement provisions, and a ten year
period allowed for gradual liquidation of bank stock holdings."'
105. Common trust funds are personal trusts and estates accounts which have been
collectively invested in accordance with the provisions of § 18 of the Comptroller's Regu-
lation 9, 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1972). Unless they are operated in accordance with Regulation
9, they are taxed as separate entities under § 584 of The Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
106. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(9)(ii) (1972). Employee benefit group funds are specifically
exempted from this limitation, 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(9) flush language (1972), probably
because a high percentage of the securities portfolios of such plans is imested in the
stock of the grantor or an affiliated company of the grantor. IIS REOrr, supra note 1.
pt. 2, at 426.
107. Proposed modifications to Regulation 9 would provide the trust department with
operating flexibility in correcting temporary excessive investments. Co.%tvrnoLL DE-
vFLop.s,"rs, supra note 33, at 343. The bank would be allowed twelve months after such
fluctuation during which to reduce the value of the holdings from the excessive amount
back to ten percent. Id.
108. For one bank's policy, see CrrmBA~ 1971 REPoRT, supra note 30, at 19:
No First National City Corporation ["FNCC"] stock is purchased by the Bank in its
various capacities without specific direction by the bank's customers. Further, where
[FNCC1 stock is received in an account at the time a relationship is established
with FNCB, such stock is held only if there is a specific agreement in the under-
lying trust or agency agreement that provides for maintenance of the holding and
indicates that the Bank has no discretionary powers over such holding. The Bank
does not vote any shares of [FNCC] stock.
109. 1 G. Ho.NsTsmN, CORPORATION LwV AND PRACrtICE § 311 (1959); H. BA..LANTINE,
BA.LANTiNE ON CoRPORATioNs 402-03 (rev. ed. 1946).
110. The Comptroller's Regulation 9 already provides that a bank may engage in a
self-dealing transaction with a trust account where required to do so by the Comptroller,
12 C.F.R. § 9.12(b)(4) (1972). Presumably, since not even self-dealing would necessitate
the liquidation of holdings, bank regulatory agencies could unilaterally grant the neces-
sary immunity from regulatory criticism.
111. Bank stocks have notoriously illiquid, thin markets. Massive liquidation of hold-
ings by banks would ruin the market in banks' stocks for innocent shareholders. Ten
years is a reasonable time period to liquidate holdings slowly and avoid unnecessary
and undesirable price fluctuations.
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III. New Regulation: Public Reporting of Certain
Investment Activities
Notwithstanding the measures recommended above, which existing
rule-making power can effect, increased public disclosure of institu-
tional and bank trust activity will be necessary to significantly improve
the present regulatory framework. The Patman Report,112 the Bank-
ing Reform Act of 1971, 13 the Institutional Investor Study Report,
14
and the Hunt Commission Reportila have all proposed that bank trust
departments make public certain information about their securities
transactions and their portfolio management. These recommendations
generally have designated the SEC to receive and process the new data
because much of the information'" would relate to the impact of
institutional investors on securities markets and portfolio company
affairs.
The present system of haphazard reports does not provide sufficient
information about institutional investing to enable individual in-
112. With the potential economic power of institutional investors as its touchstone,
the Patinan Report recommended for consideration: (1) annual disclosure by bank trust
department of aggregate holdings of securities; and (2) disclosure by bank trust depart-
ments of all proxy voting of portfolio securities of corporations registered with the SEC.
PATMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
113. Section 12 of the Banking Reform Act of 1971, based on the Patinan Report
recommendations, would have required all insured banks to report annually and pub-
licly to the FDIC a list of all securities (aggregated without regard to investment re-
sponsibilities) held in a fiduciary capacity. It also would have required a public report
indicating the extent and use of its voting authority. H.R. 5700, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 12 (1971).
114. The SEC recommended to Congress that the Exchange Act be amended to pro-
vide the Commission with authority "to require reports and disclosures of such holdings
and transactions from all types of institutional investors. IIS REPORT, supra note 2, pt.
1, at XI. The SEC proposed ownership of five percent of the outstanding shares of it
publicly held corporation as the threshold for the securities transaction and voting dis.
closure. Id. at XXX. Slightly more than one month after the IS Report was released,
Commissioner Richard B. Smith criticized § 12 of H.R. 5700's disclosure provisions as
being too narrow: § 12 only required annual reports of aggregate bank holdings, not
transactions in securities as well. Hearings on H.R. 5700, supra note 98, at 114, 123.
(Statement of Richard B. Smith, then Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission.)
115. Concerned that some financial institutions are subject to a more searching level
of disclosure than others, the Hunt Commission Report recommended that corporate
fiduciaries be required to file with "the appropriate regulatory agency" a report detail.
ing: (1) the twenty largest stock holdings, in terms of market value, unless it does not
exceed $10 million; (2) all holdings which constitute five percent or more of the out-
standing shares of a corporation registered with the SEC; (3) dollar values with respect
to each holding broken down into categories reflecting the degree of voting responsibility;
(4) interlocked officers or directors with portfolio companies in the voting category where
the bank has sole responsibility, and (5) instances where the bank voted against manage-
ment. HUNT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 102.
116. While much information is presently available to trust examiners, since they
are concerned only with the banking aspects of the data, they do not actively collect or
publish it. Indeed, the Deputy Comptroller of the Currency for Trusts does not believe
that a good case has yet been made for the collection and publication of data on certain
bank trust department investment activities. Miller, Fiduciary Guidelines for the Sev-
enties: Where Are We Headed?, 110 TRusTs & ESTATES 741, 742 (1971).
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vestors or institutional directors to compare intelligently the invest-
ment objectives, portfolio turnover, or past performance of competing
institutions. Increased information would help maintain liquid, effi-
cient capital markets for investors by facilitating the brokerage com-
munity's anticipation of institutional investing trends. Greater pub-
licity would also help deter illicit activity.117 Finally, greater disclosure
would facilitate the study of two of the SEC's chief concerns in recent
years-the future structure of the securities markets and the behavior
of institutional investors as shareholders."18
The new information on securities market structure should specifi-
cally include:
(1) turnover rates for different institutional investors;
(2) holdings of different institutional investors;
(3) changes in the level and nature of transaction volume in each
market;
(4) changes in the liquidity and "float" in specific securities;
(5) changes in the volatility of prices in securities favored by in-
stitutional investors as compared to the volatility of all securi-
ties; and
(6) the volume and dispersion of private placements among insti-
tutional investors.
With respect to institutional investors' behavior as shareholders, dis-
closure should include:
(1) voting patterns of different institutional investors;
(2) degree of interference in portfolio company affairs, such as
mergers and tender offers; and
(3) interrelationships with portfolio companies and their affiliates
which would suggest potential conflicts of interest.
The first step towards public disclosure of bank trust investment
activities is to determine which fiduciary relationships held by banks
should be subject to the securities transactions reporting provisions. 10
117. See L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 93 (1914).
118. FuTuRE STRUCTuRE STATEMEN'T, supra note 68.
119. There are indications that bankers and some members of Congress are willing
to concede that public disclosure of certain elements of bank trust dcparunent investment
activities is inevitable. See, e.g., Securities Underwriters, Municipals Firms May Be Re-
viewed by House Unit, Moss Says, Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 1972., at 3, col. 2. B)Tne, Trust
Departments, Patman Cool Dispute Over Disclosure, Conflict of Interest Rules, A.mm r.
BANr,, Jan. 24, 1972, at 1, 23.
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Trust accounts over which the bank does not have investment discre-
tion 12 0 and all personal trust and estate accounts not managed collec-
tively' 21 might be excluded. Quarterly reports should be required for
all the remaining trusts, common trust funds, pension funds, and group
employee benefit funds. Disclosure should include all significant securi-
ties purchases, sales, markets used, and quarterly holdings. 122 In addi-
tion the reporting trusts should disclose quarterly the market value and
size of all securities holdings which, after aggregation within each trust
group, exceed five percent of the outstanding shares of any corpora-
tion.'2 3 Finally, all banks administering trust assets should report an-
nually 2 4 their 100 largest securities holdings, their portfolio proxy
policy, and their investment management policies.
2 5
120. These sittlations obviously involve extremely different family situations which
would be difficult to reduce to distinct, tightly homogeneous categories for reporting
purposes. Moreover, if held directly by the beneficiaries (rather than by the bank as
trustee), these accounts would not have been subject to disclosure. It does not seem
appropriate to compel disclosure simply because the bank is administering the invest.
ment portfolios.
121. In non-discretionary accounts, the bank cannot affect the timing or sequence of
purchases or sales. A middle ground on the way to complete discretion may consist of
furnishing investment advice to a co-fiduciary. Whether this middle ground carries abuse
potential can only be determined by an analysis of the individual co-fiduciary's Invest.
meht decision-making. Though a bank might attempt to circumvent the proposed dis-
closure provisions by asking grantors to create insubstantial "straw" co-fiduclaries, SEC
rule-making (backstopped by securities law antifraud provisions) should be sufficient to
define "investment discretion" to include all trust accounts over which a bank would
hold "significant" investment discretion and thereby include all relevant advisory situ-
ations.
122. The disclosure form could be patterned after the quarterly report, Form N-1Q,
submitted to the SEC by mutual funds. 3 CCH FED. SEc. L. REr. 52,101-104, at 39,971-
978 (1971). Rule-making authority in the SEC could be used to relate "significance" to
the size of the reporting trust. For example, the trust would report each purchase, sale,
or holding which represents more than one percent of the trust corpus or exceeds
$500,000, whichever is less.
123. The Morgan Guaranty Report and the Citibank 1971 Report both disclose ag-
gregate holdings for the entire trust department segregated by dollar levels of portfolio
investment in terms of market value. TRUST AND INVESTMENT DIVISION, REPORT OF TilE
TRUST AND INVESTMENT DIVISION MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY 16-23 (1972); Crri-
BANK 1971 REPORT, supra note 30, at 28. Unless such aggregate disclosure liscriminates
between degrees of investment discretion given to a bank, its usefulness for analysis is
quite limited.
124. The disclosure form could be patterned after the annual report, Form N-IR,
submitted by mutual funds to the SEC. 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 51,961-85, at 39,831-928
(1971). Since some banks will also be reporting quarterly, the same thirty-day lag on
reporting ought to be applied to annual disclosure. Any other arrangement would lead
to unnecessary competitive advantages and disadvantages between banks.
125. SEC rule-making could expand the disclosure of bank trust department invest.
ment management policies based on public policy needs. Other items for disclosure
might include: brokerage allocation policies; securities and research information allo-
cation policies; conflict of interest restrictions; portfolio investment policies; and coni.
pensation calculations, including any performance fees earned. For example, while mu-
tual fund advisors who have performance fees presently must compute symmetrical
performance fees against a broadly-based index of securities, banks can bargain, meta-
phorically speaking, for whatever fee the traffic will bear. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1971). See
also Factors to be Considered in Connection with Investment Company Advisory Con-
tracts Concerning Incentive Fee Arrangements, SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No.
315 (April 6, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,694, at
1000
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Under the above scheme, bank regulatory agencies would retain sole
responsibility for bank solvency, and the SEC would collect informa-
tion about investment activities. The proposed disclosure system would
not be onerous; 126 for it would parallel internal reports presently pre-
pared by bank trust departments. Furthermore, the exclusion of some
trust accounts from reporting and disclosure requirements would apply
the burden only to those with sufficient size and/or discretion to pro-
duce potential for abuse.
IV. Conclusion
The proposed regulatory reforms outlined in Parts II and III obvi-
ate the need for legislatively imposed constraints on bank trust de-
partment investment activities-constraints which would petrify one
day's perceptions of a fast-changing field. 127 An alternative to these re-
forms would be separate incorporation of the trust department outside
the bank CompleX.128 Advocates of separate incorporation have argued
that its implementation would reduce the potential conflicts of interest
which exist within bank complexes and would reduce the dispropor-
tionate concentration of trust and commercial assets in the largest
banks. 2 9 However, few of the 3,000 new trust companies which would
result from separate incorporation could survive at the present level
of trust commission fees. 30 Trust companies spun off from small banks,
81,462 (1972); Survey of Investment Company Incentive Fee Arrangements, SEC Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 7120 (April 17, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,700 at 81,480 (1972).
126. On January 5, 1973, the SEC released the report of its Advisory Committee on
Investment Companies and Advisers. SEC Urged to Sinplify Reporting for Advisers, In-
vestment Concerns, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1973, at 8, col. 3. That report on the papcnork
filed by investment advisers and investment companies recommended: (1) establishing
an integrated investment company filing system; (2) simplifying investment company
prospectuses; (2) eliminating quarterly reporting of portfolio transactions of investment
companies; and (4) requiring annual reporting with quarterly up-dating for investment
advisers. SEC ADvisoRY CossmrrraE ON INVESTrMENTr COMPANIE.S AND ADVISERS, RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF REPORTING REQUIREMENT'S AND RELATED ARm.ns FOR
INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND INvESTMENT ADVISERS vii-xi (Dec. 29, 1972), [1971-1972 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH Fm. SEC. L. REP. 79,159, at 82,524 (1973).
127. See Hearings on H.R. 5700, supra note 98, pts. I and 2.
128. See, e.g., J. REmINCrON, TRUST BusiNEss IN THE FuTURE: Irs AssocmIATo. 1% rr
BANKING 17 (1938). For a discussion of problems which separate incorporation might
create, see Grisvold, Divorcement of Trust Functions from Commercial Bank, 63 TRLSr
CoMiPANIES 293 (1936).
129. The 100 largest commercial banks, measured in terms of deposits, hold just less
than fifty percent of all commercial bank deposits in the country; the 100 largest bank
trust departments hold over eighty-two percent of all bank assets. PATMAN REPORT
supra note 2, at 2.
130. Some trust commission fees could be raised unilaterally. Others, such as the fees
from personal estates, are usually fixed by state law. Even if trust commission fees could
be raised across the whole spectrum of trust accounts, a very large increase would
seriously impair banks' continuing ability to provide reasonably priced senices to small
accounts. But see Fowler, Investment Clubs: Leverage for the Little Guy, N.Y. Times,
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which presently exercise their trust powers simply to provide a needed
service in their local community, would be especially hard hit.131
Finally, one potential abuse of separate incorporation-"sweetheart"
reciprocal demand deposit arrangements between old bank complexes
and new trust companies-would have side-effects more pernicious
than either fixed minimum commission rates or any present bank re-
ciprocal practice.
1 32
Nonetheless, the alternative to incorporation envisioned in this Arti-
cle-increased reliance on trust examiners-will succeed only if these
individuals receive better training from the bank regulatory agencies
in trust law, securities regulation, and modern investment practices.
A commercial bank examiner who is assigned occasionally to do a trust
examination simply will not be sensitive enough to the nuances of
trust department investment practices. To encourage specialization
in trust examination work, bank regulatory agencies must provide
additional incentives, in the form of increased pay at the very least.
This means higher congressional appropriations and increased spend-
ing by bank regulatory agencies.
Many of the proposals of this Article assume the willingness of bank
trust departments and bank regulatory agencies themselves to formu-
late sound, reasonable policies. However, the constant threat of liti-
gation and the possibility of inhibiting legislation should provide suf-
ficient impetus for banks and bank regulatory agencies to adopt needed
reforms.
Oct. 31, 1971, § 3 (Finance) at 2; Hammer, Advisory Services for Small Investor Grow,
N.Y. Times, April 9, 1972, § 3 (Finance) at 2. Yet the SEC is presently considering al-
lowing the mass merchandising of investment and management services for small in-
vestors. SEC ADVISORY CONM. ON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES FOR INDIVIDUAL IN-
vEsroRs REPORT, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'. 79,193, at 82,620 (1973).
Trust commissions presently charged by existing trust companies were quite similar
to those charged by banks according to interviewed trust company officials. Trust com-
panies, however, because they are not "banks" for local law purposes, have been allowed
under state law to invest their capital base in growth stocks. This extra revenue source
for improving the net return on capital for trust companies reportedly exceeds the
credit on demand deposits received by some bank trust departments. An alternative to
increasing the commission fees of new trust companies would be to spin off a larger
share of the bank's complex capital base. This base could be invested in the way trust
companies do now, possibly compensating for the loss of demand deposits revenue.
131. Banks which are outside major money centers, and which therefore have smaller
capital bases, would not be capable of spinning off sufficient assets to allow new trust
companies to survive. Estate planning in many sections of the United States places great
importance on the availability of a corporate trustee whose services would be lost if such
trust companies failed.
132. If the new trust company merely deposited the uninvestable cash as a demand
deposit with the old bank, the old bank would be forced to reward the trust company
for the deposit with a panoply of "free" computer or research services since It could not
pay interest on or give internal credit for the demand deposit. Even if new trust com-
panies were prohibited from depositing cash with the old bank complexes, conceivably
a complicated system of cross-deposits and cross-services might develop among the na-
tion's banks.
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